Economics of Family: A Reading List

Ryoichi Imai and Masaru Sasaki

2004/02/06

Books

  1. Becker, Gary S. [1991], A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press.

  2. Dnes, Anthony W., and Robert Rowthorn, ed., [2002], The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press.

  3. Roth, Alvin E., Marilda A. O. Sotomayor [1990], Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press.

Articles

A. Formation and Stability of Partnerships

  1. Bloch, Francis, and Harl Ryder [2000], "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, 41(1), 93-115.

  2. Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles [1997], "Marriage and Class, Quarterly Journal of Economics.," 112, 141-68.  (自分がパートナーシップによって得る効用が、相手の属性（pizzaz）にのみ依存する場合に、層状に積み重なるパートナーシップの階層構造が形成されることを示した。)

  3. Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles [1999], "Longterm Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment," Economic Journal, 109, F307-F334.  

  4. Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles [1999], "A Note on Positive Assortative Matching, mimeo.," University of Essex.

  5. Burdett, Kenneth, Ryoichi Imai, and Randall Wright [2004], "Unstable Relationships," Frontiers of Macroeconomics (B.E. Journals in Macroeconomics), 1(1), 1-42. （パートナーシップの内在的不安定性（intra-match instability）が、多重均衡および社会的に過大なサーチを招くことを、一般均衡モデルで示した。）

  6. Cornelius, Tracy J. [2003], "A search model of marriage and divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics 6, 135-155.　（異質な経済主体（といってもレベルは２段階だが）の仮定で、結婚の安定性を考察している。基本的な洞察は、Burdett, Imai, and Wright [2004] と同じ。）

  7. Ghosh, Parikshit, and Debraj Ray [1996], "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, 63, 491-519.

  8. Kranton, Rachel E. [1996], "The Formation of Cooperative Relationships," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 12(1), 214-33.

  9. Mortensen Dale T. [1978], "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover," Bell Journal of Economics, 9, 572-586.

  10. Mortensen, Dale T. [1988], "Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise," American Journal of Sociology, 94, S215-S240. （一般均衡モデルによる、サーチ環境での結婚と離婚の、おそらく最初の定式化。）

  11. Ramey, Garey and Joel Watson [1997], "Contractual Fragility, Job Destruction, and Business Cycles," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 873-911.

  12. Shimer, Robert and Lones Smith [2000], "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, 68(2), 343-370.（効用が分割可能な場合に、サーチ環境の下で、事前的に異質的（ex-ante heterogeneous）な個人がどのようなパートナーシップを形成するかを考察した代表的論文。）

  13. Shimer, Robert and Lones Smith [2001], "Matching, Search, and Heterogeneity," Advances in Macroeconomics (B.E. Journals in Macroeconomics), 1(1), 1-15.　（前項論文の枠組みで、サーチが各人の属性に応じて社会的に過大ないし過少になること示した。具体的には、平均的レベル以上の個人のサーチは過少であり、平均的レベル以下の個人のサーチは過大である。 ）

B. Marriage, Divorce, and Institutions

  1. Allen, Douglas W. [2002], "The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and Divorce," in Dnes and Rowthorn [2002].

  2. Becker, Gary S., Elisabeth M. Landes, and Robert T. Michael [1977], "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1141-87.

  3. Bergstrom, Theodore C. [1996], "Economics in a Family Way,! Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 1903-34.

  4. Bergstrom, Theodore C., and Mark Bagnoli [1993], "Courtship as a Waiting Game," Journal of Political Economy 101(1), 185-202.

  5. Friedberg, Leora [1998], "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data", American Economic Review, 88(3), 608-27.　（合意による離婚（divorce on agreement）から一方の意思による離婚（unilateral divorce）への意向は、離婚を有意に増やしたことを米国州別データで検証した、比較的新しい論文。）

  6. Weiss, Yoram. and Robert. Willis (1993) "Divorce Settelements: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, 11: 629-79

  7. Weiss, Yoram. and R.obert Willis (1997) "Match Quality, New Information and Marital Dissolution," Journal of Labor Economics, 15(supplement): 293-329.

  8. Wong , Linda Y [2003a], "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," Journal of Labor Economics, 21(3), 699-728.　（階層結婚の構造モデルを本格的に実証した、おそらく最初のモデル。白人男性にとっては、教育より賃金の方が結婚できるかどうかを左右している。 ）

  9. Wong , Linda Y [2003b], "Why do only 5.5% of black men marry white women?" International Economic Review, 44(3), 803-26.

C. Specialization and Distribution within Households

  1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre [1988], "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica 56(1), 63-90.

  2. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre [1992], "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy 100(3), 437-467.

  3. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Bernard Fortin, and Guy Lacroix [2002], "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37-72.

  4. Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak [1993], "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, 101, 988-1010.　（家庭内分業と分配を同時決定する交渉ゲームにおいて、威嚇点として非協力ゲームの均衡を提案した。）

  5. Lundberg, Shelly and Robert A. Pollak [1996],  "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4), 139-58.

D. Other Topics

  1. Edlund Lena [1999], "Son Preferences, Sex Ratios, and Marriage Patterns," Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), pt.1, 1275-1304.

  2. Edlund, Lena, and Evelyn Korn, "A Theory of Prostitution," Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110(1), 181-214.

  3. Kremer, Michael [1997], "How much does sorting increase inequality?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 115-139.　（学校や結婚の序列化は、同一世代内ではそれほどの不平等を生み出さないが、世代を越えた階層の固定化には貢献する。）