Advanced Macroeconomics

Readings

Ryoichi Imai

2004/12/10

Table of Contents

I. Growth Theory

II. Labor Market Theory

III. Search Theory

IV. Miscellaneous Topics

Books

  1. Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt [1998], Endogenous Economic Growth, MIT Press.

  2. Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin [1995], Economic Growth, MIT Press.

  3. Jones, Charles I. [1998], Introduction to Economic Growth, Norton.

  4. Pissarides, Christopher A. [2000], Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition, MIT Press.

  5. Romer, David [2001], Advanced Macroeconomics, Second Edition, McGraw-Hill.

  6. Saint-Paul, Gilles [2000], The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions, Oxford University Press.

I. Growth Theory

Engines of Economic Growth 

  1. Hayashi, Fumio and Edward C. Prescott [2000], The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade, Working Paper 607, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

  2. Lucas, Jr., Robert E. [1993], Making a Miracle, Econometrica, vol.61. no.2, 251-272.

  3. Prescott, Edward C. [1998], Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity, International Economic Review, 39(3), 525-551.

  4. Prescott, Edward C. [2002], Prosperity and Depression, American Economic Review, 92(2), 1-15.

Transitional Dynamics of the Neoclassical Growth Models 

  1. Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995], Chapter 2.

  2. King, Robert G., and Sergio Rebelo [1993], Transitional Dynamics and Economic Growth in the Neoclassical Model, American Economic Review, 83(4), 908-931.

  3. Mulligan, Casey B., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin [1993], Transitional Dynamics in Two-Sector Models of Endogenous Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 739-773.

Models of Endogenous Growth 

  1. Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt [1992], A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction, Econometrica, 60(2), 323-351.

  2. Aghion and Howitt [1998], Ch.2.

  3. Jones, Charles I. [1995], R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth, Journal of Political Economy, 103, 759-84.  

  4. Itoh, Motoshige, and Kazuharu Kiyono [1987], Welfare-enhancing Export Subsidies, Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), 115-137.

  5. Matsuyama, Kiminori [1999], Growing through Cycles, Econometrica, 67, 335-347.

  6. Saint-Paul, Gilles [1992], Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1243-1259.

  7. Tornell, Aaron [1997], Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights, Journal of Economic Growth, 2: 219-250.

Growth and Unemployment 

  1. Agion and Howitt [1998], Ch.4.

  2. Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt [1994], Growth and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies.

  3. Mortensen Dale T. and Christopher A. Pissarides [1998], Technological Progress, Job Creation, and Job Destruction, Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 733-753.

Growth and Inequality 

  1. Acemoglu, Daron [1997], Matching, Heterogeneity, and the Evolution of Income Distribution, Journal of Economic Growth 2, 61-92.

  2. Aghion and Howitt [1998], Ch.9.

  3. Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton [1992], Distribution and Growth in Models of Imperfect Capital Markets, European Economic Review 36, 603-611.

  4. Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton [1997], A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development, Review of Economic Studies, 64, 151-172.

  5. Alesina, Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos [2003], Fairness and Redistributions, mimeo.

  6. Alesina, Alberto, and Dani Rodrik [1994], Distributive Politics and Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 465-490.

  7. Piketty, Thomas [1997], The Dynamics of wealth Distribution and the Interest Rate with Credit Rationing, Review of Economic Studies 64, 173-189.

  8. Banarjee, Abhijit V., and Andrew F. Newman [1991], Risk Bearing and the Theory of Income Distribution, Review of Economic Studies, 58, 211-235.

  9. Banarjee, Abhijit V., and Andrew F. Newman [1991], Occupational Choice and the Process of Development [1993], Journal of Political Economy, 101, no.2, 274-98.

  10. Ghatak, Maitreesh, Massimo Morelli, and Tomas Sjoestroem [2001], Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 781-810.

  11. Galor, Oded, and Joseph Zeira [1993], Income Distribution and Macroeconomics, Review of Economic Studies, 60, 35-52.

  12. Gromm, Gerhard, and B. Ravikumar [1992], Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality, Journal of Political Economy 100(4), 818-34.

  13. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and John Moore [1997], Credit Cycles, Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 211-48.

  14. Matsuyama, Kiminori [2000], Endogenous Inequality, Review of Economic Studies, 743-759.

  15. Mendez, Rodrigue [2002], Creative Destruction and the Rise of Inequality, Journal of Economic Growth, 7, 259-281.

Evidences on Inequality

  1. Arrow, Bowles, and Durlauf [2000], Meritocracy and Economic Inequality, Princeton University Press.

  2. Hashimoto, M., and J. Raisian [1985], Employment, Tenure, and Earnings Profiles," American Economic Review 75(4).

  3. Hernstein and Murray [1994], The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, The Free Press.

  4. McMahon, W. W. [1991], "Relative Returns to Human and Phisical Capital in the U.S. and Efficient Investment," Economics of Education Reviews 10(4), 1991.

  5. Mincer, J. [1974], Schooling, Experience and Earning, NBER.

  6. Murnane, R. J., and Levy, F. [1993], "Why Today's Higher-School-Educated Males Earn Less than Their Fathers Did," Harvard Educational Review 63(1), 1-19. 

  7. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce [1993], "Wages Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill," Journal of Political Economy 101(3), 1993.

Empirical Evidences of Economic Growth

  1. Aghion and Howitt [1998], Ch.12.

  2. Jones, C. I. [1995], R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth, Journal of Political Economy 103: 759-784.

  3. Jones, C. I. [1999], Growth: With or Without Scale Effects? American Economic Review 89(2), 139-144.

  4. Kremer, Michael [1993], Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(4), 681-716.

  5. Mankiw, N. G., D. Romer, and D. N. Weil [1992], A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(2), 407-432.

  6. Young, A. [1995], The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience,  Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 641-680.

II. Labor Market Theory

Education

  1. Burdett, Kenneth [1978], The Testing and Sorting Functions of Higher Education, Journal of Public Economics 16, 117-122.

  2. Futagami, Koichi, and Shingo Ishiguro [2004], Signal-Extracting Education in an Overlapping Generations Model, Economic Theory 24, 129-16.

  3. Winston, Gordon C. [1999], Subsidies, Hierarchy, and Peers: The Awkward Economics of Higher Education, Journal of Economic Perspectives 13(1), 13-36.

Internal Labor Markets

  1. Carmichael, H. Lorne [1988], Incentives in Academics: Why is there tenure? Journal of Political Economy, 96, 453-72.,

  2. Lazear, Edward P. [1979], Why is There Mandatory Retirement?, Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 1261-84. 

  3. Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen [1981], Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-864.

  4. Green, Jerry R, and Nancy Stokey [1983], A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts ", Journal of Political Economy, 91 (June 1983), pp. 349-364.

Unemployment

  1. Saint-Paul, Gilles [1995], The High Unemployment Trap, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

  2. Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph Stiglitz [1984], Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker's Discipline Device, American Economic Review, 433-444.

Insurance

Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer [1998], Optimal Unemployment Insurance, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 343-69. 

Chiu, W. Henry, and Edi Karni [1998], Endogenous Adverse Selection Under Unemployment Insurance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(4)), 806-827. 

III. Search Theory

Basic Models 

  1. Romer, David [2001], Ch.9.

  2. Diamond, Peter A. [1982], Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy, vol.90, 881-894.

  3. Mortensen, Dale T. [1982]., Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games, American Economic Review 72(5), 968-79.

  4. Pissarides [2000], Ch. 2, Ch.3, and Ch.4.

  5. Mortensen, Dale T. [1988], Matching: Finding a Partner for Life or Otherwise, American Journal of Sociology 94, S215-S240.

  6. Mortensen and Pissarides [1998], New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor Market.

  7. Rogerson, Richard, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright [2004], Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey, mimeo.

Price Distribution

  1. Burdett, Kenneth and Kenneth L. Judd [1983], Equilibrium Price Distribution, Econometrica 51(4), 955-69.

  2. Burdett and Mortensen [1998], Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment, International Economic Review, 39(2), 257-273.

  3. Fershtman, Chaim and Arhtur Fishman [1992], Price Cycles and Booms: Dynamic Search Equiliblium, American Economic Review, 82(5), 1221-33.

  4. Hopenhayn, Hugo A., and Edward Prescott [1992], Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economics, Econometrica 60(6), 1387-1406.

  5. McAfee, R. Preston [1993], Mechanism Design By Competitive Sellers, Econometrica, 61(6), 1281-1312.

Job Auction, Directed Search, and Competitive Search Equilibrium

  1. Burdett, Shi, and Wright [2001], Pricing and Matching with Frictions, Journal of Political Economy, 109(5), 1060-1085.

  2. De Fraja, Gianni, and Jozsef Sakovics [2001], Warlas Retrouve: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive Price, Journal of Political Economy, 109(4), 842-863..

  3. Julien, Benoit, John Kennes, and Ian King [1998], Bidding for Labor, Review of Economic Dynamics, 3,619-649.

  4. Moen, Espen R. [1997], Competitive Search Equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 385-411.

  5. Do Good Workers Hurt Bad Workers - Or Is It the Other Way Around?, International Economic Review, 44(2), 779-800.

  6. Peters, Michael [1997], A Competitive Distribution of Auctions, Review of Economic Studies 64, 97-123.

  7. Sattinger, Michael [1995], Search and the Efficient assignment of Workers to Jobs, International Economic Review, 36, 283-302.

  8. Shi, Shouyoung [2002], A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill-Biased Technology, Review of Economic Studies 69, 467-491.

  9. Shimer, Robert [1999], Job Auctions, mimeo., Princeton University.

Efficiency and the Hold-Up Problem 

  1. Acemoglu, Daron [1996], A Microfoundation for Social Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation, Quarterly Jouurnal of Economics, vol.111, 779-804.

  2. Acemoglu, Daron, and Robert Shimer [1999], Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions, International Economic Review, 40, 827-850.

  3. Hosios, Arthur J. [1990], On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies.

  4. Lagos, Ricardo [2000], An Alternative Approach to Search Frictions, Journal of Political Economy 108(5), 851-73. 

  5. Moen, Espen R. [1999], ``Education, Ranking, and Competition for Jobs'', Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4), 694-723.

  6. Masters, Adrian M. [1998], Efficiency of Investment in Human and Physical Capital in A Model of Bilateral Search and Bargaining, International Economic Review 39(2), 477-494.

Job Creation and Destruction

  1. Acemoglu, Daron [2001], Good Jobs and Bad Jobs, Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1), 1-21. 

  2. Barlevy, Gadi [2002], The Sullying Effects of Recessions, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

  3. Burdett, Kenneth [1978], A Theory of Employee Job Search and Quit Rates, American Economic Review, 68(1), 212-20.

  4. Burdett, Kenneth, Ricardo Lagos, and Randall Wright [2003], Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, American Economic Review, 93(5), 1764-1777.

  5. Burdett, Kenneth, Ricardo Lagos, and Randall Wright [2004], An On-the-Job Search Model of Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, International Economic Review 45(3), 681-706.

  6. Burdett and Mortensen [1998], Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment, International Economic Review 39(2), 257-73.

  7. Caballero, Ricardo J., and Mohamad L. Hammour [1994], The Cleansing Effect of Recessions, American Economic Review, 84(5), 1350-68.

  8. Caballero, Ricardo J., and Mohamad L. Hammour [1999], The Cost of Recessions Revisited: A Reverse-Liquidationist View, NBER Working Paper No. 7355. 

  9. Jovanovic, Boyan [1978], Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, Journal of Political Economy 87(5), 972-990.

  10. Mortensen [1978], Specific Capital and Labor Turnover, Bell Journal of Economics, 572-86.

  11. Mortensen and Pissarides [1994], Job Creation and Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies 61, 477-94.

  12. Pissarides [1994], Search Unemployment with On-the-Job Search, Review of Economic Studies 61, 457-475.

  13. Postel-Vinay, Fabien and Jean-Marc Robin [2002], The Distribution of Earnings in an Equilibrium Search Model with State-Dependent Offers and Counteroffers, International Economic Review 43(4), 989-1016.

  14. Saint-Paul, Gilles [2002], The Political Economy of Employment Protection, Journal of Political Economy 110(3), 672-704.

Middlemen

  1. Li, Yiting [1998], Middlemen and Private Information, Journal of Monetary Economics 42, 131-59.

  2. Shevchenko, Andrei [2004], Middlemen, International Economic Review 45(1), 1-24.

Training and Turnover

  1. Acemoglu, Daron [1999], Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence, American Economic Review, vol 89, 1259-1278.

  2. Acemoglu, Daron, and Steve Pischke [1998], Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 79-119.

  3. Acemoglu, Daron, and Steve Pischke [1999], The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training, Journal of Political Economy 107, 539-572.

  4. Acemoglu, Daron, and Steve Pischke [1999], Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labor Markets, Economic Journal Features, 109, F112-142.

  5. Albrecht, James, and Susan Vroman [2002], A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements, International Economic Review, 43(1), 283-305.

  6. Burdett and Smith [2002], The Low Skill Trap, European Economic Review, 46, 1439-1451.

  7. Imai, Ryoichi [2002], On-the-Job Search and General Training, mimeo.

  8. Imai, Ryoichi [2002], Are Unskilled Workers Efficiently Unemployed? mimeo. 

  9. Takizawa, Hajime [2000], An Equilibrium Model of Investment in General Skill under Search Friction, mimeo., Northwestern University.

Search, Matching, and Heterogeneity

  1. Bloch, Francis, and Harl Ryder [2000], Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers, International Economic Review, 41(1), 93-115.

  2. Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles [1997], Marriage and Class, Quarterly Journal of Economics. 

  3. Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles [1999], Longterm Partnership Formation: Marriage and Employment, Economic Journal, 109, F307-F334.  

  4. Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles [1999], A Note on Positive Assortative Matching, mimeo., University of Essex.

  5. Shimer, Robert and Lones Smith [2000], Assortative Matching and Search, Econometrica. 

  6. Shimer, Robert and Lones Smith [2000], Matching, Search, and Heterogeneity, Advances in Macroeconomics

Stability of the Partnerships

  1. Burdett, Kenneth, Ryoichi Imai, and Randall Wright [2002], Unstable Relationships, PIER Working Paper #02-037, University of Pennsylvania, forthcoming in Frontiers in Macroeconomics..

  2. Ghosh, Parikshit, and Debraj Ray [1996], Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows, Review of Economic Studies, 63, 491-519.

  3. Jeong, Byeongiu [2003], The Welfare Effects of Mobility Restrictions, Review of Economic Dynamics 6, 685-696.

  4. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Ricardo Lagos [2004], A Model of Job and Worker Flows, mimeo.

  5. Kranton, Rachel E. [1996], The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 12(1), 214-33.

  6. Ramey, Garey and Joel Watson [1997], Contractual Fragility, Job Destruction, and Business Cycles, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Economics of Marriage and Divorce

  1. Allen, Douglas W. (2002), "The Impact of Legal Reforms on Marriage and Divorce," in Dnes and Rowthorn (2002).

  2. Becker, Gary S. [1991], A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press.

  3. Becker, Gary S., Elisabeth M. Landes, and Robert T. Michael [1977], An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1141-87.

  4. Becker, G., E. Landes, and R. Michael (1977), "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, 85, 1141-87.

  5. Bergstrom, Theodore C. [1996], Economics in a Family Way, Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 1903-34.

  6. Bergstrom, Theodore C., and Mark Bagnoli [1993], Courtship as a Waiting Game, Journal of Political Economy 101(1), 185-202.

  7. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Bernard Fortin, and Guy Lacroix [2002], Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply, Journal of Political Economy, 110(1), 37-72.

  8. Dnes, Anthony W., and Robert Rowthorn, ed., (2002), The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, Cambridge University Press.

  9. Edlund Lena [1999], Son Preferences, Sex Ratios, and Marriage Patterns, Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), pt.1, 1275-1304.

  10. Edlund, Lena, and Evelyn Korn, "A Theory of Prostitution", Journal of Political Economy, 2002, vol.110. no.1.

  11. Lundberg, S. and R. Pollak [1993], Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 988-1010.

  12. Wong, Y. Linda [2004], Structural Estimation of Marriage Models, Journal of Labor Economics.

Search-Theoretic Models of Money 

  1. Kocherlatoka, Narayana [1998], Money is Memory, Journal of Economic Theory, 81, 232-51.

  2. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright [1989], JPE.

  3. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright [1991], A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Money, Journal of Economic Theory, 53, 215-235.

  4. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright [1993], A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics, American Economic Review, 83(1), 63-77.

  5. Lagos, Riccardo, and Randall Wright [2003], A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis, mimeo.

  6. Rocheteau, Guillaume, and Randall Wright [2000], Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium, Econometrica, forthcoming.

  7. Shi, Shouyong [1997], A Divisible Search Model of Fiat Money, Econometrica, 65, 75-102.

  8. Trejos, Alberto, and Randall Wright [1995], Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices, Journal of Political Economy 103, 118-41.

  9. Green and Zhou [?]

IV. Miscellaneous Topics

Coordination Failures 

  1. Cooper, Russel [1999], Coordination Games, Cambridge University Press

  2. Morris, Stephen, and Hyun Song Shin [2000], Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling, mimeo., Yale University.

  3. Bernanke, Ben, and Mark Gertler [1989], Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations, American Economic Review, 14-31.

  4. Imai, Ryoichi [2001], Simple Coordination Games Which Have a Unique Solution, NUCB Journal of Economics and Management, vol.45, no.2, 107-114.

Money

  1. Auerbach, Alan J. and Maurice Obstfeld [2003], The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap, American Economic Review, forthcoming.

  2. Auerbach, Alan J. and Maurice Obstfeld [2004], Monetary and Fiscal Remedies for Deflation, American Economic Review 94(2), 71-75.

  3. Benhabib, Jess, Stephanie Schmitte-Grohe, and Martin Uribe [2002], Avoiding Liquidity Traps, Journal of Political Economy, 110(3), 535-563.

  4. Ono, Yoshiyasu [2001] A Reinterpretation of Chapter 17 of Keynes's General Theory: Effective Demand Shortage under Dynamic Optimization, International Economic Review, 42(1), 207-236.

  5. Stockman, Alan C. [1981], Anticipated Inflation and the Capital Stock in a Cash-In-Advance Economy, Journal of Monetary Economics 8, 387-393.

Financial Markets

  1. Barlevy, Gadi, and Pietro Veronesi [1999], Information Aquisition in Financial Markets, Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

  2. Barlevy, Gadi, and Pietro Veronesi [2000], Rational Panics and Stock Markets Crashes, mimeo., Northwestern University.

  3. Grossman, Sanford [1976], On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where Traders Have Diverse Information, Journal of Finance, XXXI(2), 573-85.

  4. Grossman Sanford J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz [1980], On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, American Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408.

Global Macroeconomics

  1. Banerjee, Abhijit V. [1992], A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics CVII(3), 797-817.

  2. Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo [2001], Prospective Deficits and the Asian Currency Crisis, Journal of Political Economy, 109(6), 1155-1197.

  3. Corsetti, Giancarlo, Stephen Morris, and Hyun Song Shin [2004], Does One Soros Make a Difference? The Role of a Large Trader in Currency Crises, Review of  Economic Studies 71 (2004), 87-114.

  4. Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesanti, and Nouriel Roubini [2000], The Role of a Large Players in Currency Crises, mimeo., New York University.

  5. Krugman, Paul [2000], Thinking About the Liquidity Trap, Journal of the Japanese and International Economics 14, 221-237.

  6. Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin [1998] Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, American Economic Review, 88(3), 587-597.

  7. Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin [2000], Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modelling, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 139-181.

Social Security Reform

  1. Prescott. C. Edward [2004], Why do Americans Work so Much More than Europeans?, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 28, No.1, 2-13.

Monopolistic Competition

Ciccone, Antonio, and Kiminori Matsuyama [1999], Efficiency and Equilibrium with Dynamic Increasing Aggregate REturns Due to Demana Complementarities, Econometrica, 67(3), 499-525.

Matsuyama, Kiminori [1995], Complementarities and Cumulative Process in Models of Monopolistic Competition, Journal of Economic Literature XXXIII, 701-729.

Socio-Economics

  1. Cole, Harold L, George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite [1992], Social Norms, Saving Behavior, and Growth, Journal of Political Economy 100(6), 1092-1125., 

  2. Fershtman, Chaim, Kevin M. Murphy, and Yoram Weiss [1996], Social Status, Education, and Growth, Journal of Political Economy 104(1), 108-132. 

  3. Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Jeff E. Biddle [1994], Beauty and the Labor Market, American Economic Review 84(5), 1174-94. 

  4. Mailath, George J., Larry Samuelson, and Avner Shaked [2000], Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search, American Economic Review, 90(1), 46-72..